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LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW—AND WHY CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IS LEGALLY INSUPPORTABLE
PETER FITZPATRICK1
It is fitting at the outset to thank my gracious and scholarly colleague, Professor
Tayyab Mahmud, not just for his abounding generosity since my coming here, but
for all that he did to make that possible. My gratitude can also be confidently
generalized. Having some affection for the medieval notion of the wandering
scholar, and having visited many academic institutions, in none have I been received
with a more expansive kindness or with a more effective concern, whether it be by
Dean Steinglass and a thoroughly efficient administration, by the exciting academic
community, or by the truly remarkable librarians. No matter how well briefed one
may be beforehand, visits of this kind always offer engaging revelations; always
reveal pockets of surprising scholarship. Cleveland-Marshall College of Law has
certainly been no exception. That serendipity extends to the students and to the
discovery that so often their enthusiasm and intellectual commitment spring from the
work many of them do along with their studies. Here was a felt affinity since my
law degrees were acquired whilst working.
And, here also is another apt connection. The generous endowment of the Chair
which I am privileged to occupy—the Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker & Hostetler
Chair—marks the life and achievements of one of the firm’s founding partners,
Joseph C. Hostetler. Not the least of his achievements was to have combined work
and study for his law degree. And he did this by way of occupations having a certain
cachet which mine lacked: a synoptic history of the firm has it that he worked his
way through Case Western Reserve Law School, at one point selling suspenders in
every state in the Union, at another working as a police beat reporter. To bring
things a little more up to date, I am ultimately grateful to Mr. John Deaver Drinko
and his colleagues for the great opportunity they have provided me.
Savigny made the startling claim that “law has no existence for itself; rather its
essence lies . . . in the very life of men.” And, he would doubtless now add, “in the
very life of women.”2 An oblique but, hopefully, productive way of making out that
claim would be to see what happens to this existential imperative—to law's integral
commitment to life—when law is called upon to deal death. In responding to such a
call, and if Savigny is right, law should then manifest something of a fundamental
dissonance, even a terminal incoherence. In this lecture, I want to show how that is
what happens in the judicial discourse on the death penalty in the United States. I
will approach this demonstration in a way that may at first seem paradoxical, in a
way that will bring out the deep affinity between law and death. That affinity is one
in which death is, in a sense, the limit of law-a limit that constitutes law. Law
cannot, then, go beyond its own constituent limit.

1
Thanks to Linda Usdin for orientations, to Louise Mooney and Marie Rehmar for
making an occasion of this talk, and to Phyllis Crocker for a generosity of references.
2

See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER
Heller-Roazen trans. 1998).
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In its supreme stasis, death is often equated with “law itself in its origin, in its
very order.”3 This tends to be put in terms of death as the ultimate or final assertion
of law as sovereign, its mundane mode being capital punishment.4 Borrowing
Dean's apt summary, law becomes a “principal instrument” of a transcendent
sovereignty whence it is “backed up by coercive sanctions ultimately grounded in the
right of death of the sovereign.”5 All of which gives some force to law’s deathly
claim to determine finally, to fix and hold life, denying its protean possibility. Death
in this guise can be found, for example, fully operative in the Benthamite dream of
“total and certain order” through law.6 Or it can be found in the quest of legal
positivists for such an order within law itself—a law which, in its achieved
autonomy, would not have any essential relation to what is beyond it. Such a selfsufficing law “sever[s] its relation to the lifeworld by constituting that world of
mundane sociality as its outside or other.”7 In this dimension of it, death, being
“always the horizon of the law,” is a horizon which cannot be gone beyond, which
denies any essential relation beyond it, leaving that which it demarcates to its own
immanence, to its self-posited autonomy.8
There is, however, a diametrically different sense in which death is the horizon of
the law. The horizon now is not a closed finality but the opening to all possibility
that is beyond affirmed order. Death denies and dissolves such order and makes
something else possible, something unknowable with any assurance beforehand: “it
exposes us to the immeasurability of something we can never experience.”9 So, to
“make a work of death” by regarding its finality only, and by constituting an
autonomous law in the image of death, is to deny the importunate mystery of death
itself. Death in its determinate predictability is not only the greatest certainty but, in
its opening to what is unknowably beyond, also the greatest uncertainty—and, what
is central to my argument, it is death which makes uncertainty as uncertainty
certain.10 “Things” are always dying to what they are and, in this dying, the
3

Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 42 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds. & Mary
Quaintance trans. 1992); Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN
INTRODUCTION 144 (Robert Hurley trans. 1981).
4
See, e.g., John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 308 ¶ 3 (1965); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE
331-33 (John Ladd trans. 1965); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 49 (Alan Sheridan trans. 1979).
5

MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY 105 (1999).

6

DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 281 (1989).

IN

7

Peter Goodrich, Fate as Seduction: The Other Scene of Legal Judgement, in CLOSURE OR
CRITIQUE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL THEORY 117 (Alan Norrie ed. 1993).
8

This resonates with rejection and denial. Death can, however, be affirming when chosen
instead of continuing life in terms contrary to what that life had been, dying rather than
renouncing a belief or a friendship for example—‘the affirmation of value, up against the
boundary of death.” JOHN BOWKER, THE MEANINGS OF DEATH 39 (1991).
9

FRANÇOISE DASTUR, DEATH: AN ESSAY ON FINITUDE 4 (John Llewelyn trans. 1996).

10

JEAN-LUC NANCY, THE INOPERATIVE COMMUNITY 12-13 (Peter Connor trans. 1991).
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possibility of their being other than what they are is continually created. Law, then,
is also this uncertain dimension of death and even, in a sense, primarily so, since law
is only called to affirm certainty in the face of uncertainty. Before saying more
about these two dimensions of death and the law, and especially about the effect of
their combination, let me “set” the story so far in familiar terms.
Here I will combine a regard for the logics of the rule of law with a regard for
Thomas Hobbes. To start with Hobbes: On first looking into his Leviathan, into the
founding text of Western secular government, what we seem to find is a most
complete justification for sovereign power. Life in the natural state, where we find a
war of all against all, is so “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” that there is a
primal transfer of “all power and strength” to a singular, sovereign ruler, and in this
way the subject becomes comprehensively committed to all actions of the sovereign
“as if they were his own”; subjects are thus inextricably bound to Leviathan “to him
that beareth their person,” and so much so that “none of his subjects can be freed
from his subjection.”11 Having such an encompassing, such a complete power over
life, there would seem to be nothing in the way of Leviathan's taking it away. At this
point, however, Hobbes circumscribes the power of Leviathan. Since the primal
covenant is entered into for the preservation of life, should Leviathan seek to take
life away, he can be utterly resisted.12 So, in his very power of determination—
determination through laws that are the “command” of the sovereign—Leviathan
must have a responsive regard to where that power came from. Hobbes would go
even further in Leviathan's regard for life. With this unexpectedly tender side to
him, Leviathan has to secure “the safety of the people,” but “by safety here is not
meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man
by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to
himself.”13 So much is this so, that Hobbes deduces from it an extensive list of
“liberties” of the subject and a most extensive collection of “duties” imposed on
Leviathan for ensuring the well-being and improvement of the people.14 Laws, the
very command of Leviathan, must be infused with a responsive regard for his
subjects.15
Let me now take this perhaps surprising divide in the power and the laws of
Leviathan, a divide between determinative force and responsiveness, and transpose it
to the logics of the rule of law. Countless histories and juridical affirmations would
have us believe that certainty, predictability, and order characterize the rule of law.
As against the vagaries of an arbitrary and discretionary power, the rule of law
clearly marked out an area of calculability in which the individual could now
purposively progress. In order for this law, and “not men,” to rule, it had to be
coherent, closed and complete. If it were not coherent but contradictory, something
else could be called on to resolve the contradiction. If it were open rather than
closed, then something else could enter in and rule along with law. If it were
11

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 85, 100-01 – chs. 13, 17 and 18 (Encyclopedia Britannica
1952).
12

Id. at 115 – ch. 21.

13

Id. at 153 – ch. 30.

14

Id. at ch. 30.

15

See, e.g., id. at 113, 132, 139 – chs. 21, 26 and 27.
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incomplete and not a whole corpus juris, and if it were thence related to something
else, then that something else could itself rule or share in ruling with law. For all of
which, law had to be self-generating and self-regulating because, if it were
dependent upon something apart from itself for these things, then, again, those things
would rule along with or instead of law.
We can, however, take each of these imperative qualities of the rule of law and
evoke their opposite “in” the rule of law itself. For law to rule, it has to be able to do
anything, if not everything. It cannot, then, simply secure stability and predictability
but also has to do the opposite: it has to ensure that law is ever responsive to change;
otherwise, law will eventually cease to rule the situation that has changed around it.
So, how could the rule of law be complete if it must ever respond to the infinite
variety of fact and circumstance impinging on it? How could it be closed when it
must hold itself constantly responsive to all that is beyond what it may at any
moment be? And how could law, in extending to what is continually other to itself,
avoid pervasive contradiction? Law cannot be purely fixed and pre-existent if it is to
change and adapt to society, as it is so often said that it must. Its determinations
cannot be entirely specific, clear and conclusive if it has integrally or at the same
time to exceed all determination, to assume a quality of “everywhereness.”16
We can also see modern law similarly stretched between stable determination and
responsive change in the persistent squabbles that so enliven jurisprudential thought.
These intractably polarized debates alternate between law's being autonomous and its
being dependent. Taking the latter first, it is readily said that law is dependent on
society, politics, the popular spirit, scientific administration, the economy, or the
narratives in which it is embedded. In a more diachronic vein, we are told that law
has to change along with society or history otherwise it becomes increasingly
irrelevant and, eventually, obsolete. The contrary claims for autonomy, although a
little more venerable, have not lost any of the force of their assertion. With them law
somehow has to stand apart from the remorseless demands of society, history, and so
on, and even to exclude its “own history.”17 In being so placed, “absolute and
detached from any origin,” law not only stands distinctly apart from, say, society, but
also orders, shapes, or even creates society—to adopt long-enduring and standard
formulations.18 To the extent that society does not so conform, law yet retains its
hold as the measure against which that “failure” and passing imperfection are to be
measured. In this, and indeed in all the various applications and changes throughout
its history, a law remains insistently that law. Law's autonomous binding force
cannot be contained by what it is or has been, by its history, but extends to all that it
will be. Law is eternally present.
Given this divide and its persistence, perhaps inquiry should be diverted. Rather
than seeking law in that which simply conforms to either side or both sides of the
opposition, perhaps we could seek a law which “is” in-between the opposed
dimensions, which “is” the experienced combination of them, and which has its
16

A. Carty, English Constitutional Law from a Postmodernist Perspective, in DANGEROUS
SUPPLEMENTS: RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL IN JURISPRUDENCE 196 (P. Fitzpatrick ed. 1991).
17
JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS
1992).

OF

LITERATURE: (BEFORE

THE

LAW) 190 (Avital Ronell trans.

18

See id. at 194; D.R. KELLEY, HISTORY, LAW AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: MEDIEVAL AND
RENAISSANCE PERSPECTIVES 42-45 (1984); LIEBERMAN, supra note 6, at 281.
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being because each dimension is inexorable yet unable to be experienced by itself.
And perhaps these dimensions are equivalent to the divide between law’s autonomy
and law’s dependence. If so, then it would seem that the condition of being in law is
always unresolved and calling for incessant decision and judgment. Nonetheless, we
may find prospects for resolution in these dimensions being not only opposed but
also somehow integral to each other. A complete determination of position and a
responsiveness to what is beyond position are antithetical things, but there can be
neither position without responsiveness to what is always beyond it nor
responsiveness without a position from which to respond. In their separation, these
dimensions mark the horizon of law, the horizon both as a condition and quality of
its contained being, and the horizon opening onto all which lies beyond that being.
These dimensions of law are integral to each other. The separate insistence on each
would be death, carrying with it either a terminal fixity or a dissolving
responsiveness to what is beyond. Law subsists in-between these two dimensions.
Operatively, law so subsists in the decision—the decision of the subject, the
judge, and the legislator. The legal decision is always unique. It cannot be rendered
beforehand in terms of some empirical reality or in terms of a previous decision. If it
could be reduced in either of those ways, there would be no “call” for the decision,
no demand for “fresh judgment.”19 Put another way, the responsibility—or, in terms
of an archaic usage, the responsability—involved in judgment cannot be
accommodated within the determined or the known. There is always “in” the legal
judgment a “secret,” a mystery, a “madness.”20 The point can be concentrated by
way of an example. It is exactly because the political trial eliminates the judicial
ability to respond, that the judge in such a trial is not considered to be making a legal
decision. The trial is “fixed”—in both the standard and colloquial senses.21 To be
“legal,” the decision must be approached in openness. The decision could always
have been otherwise than what it is. Yet, for a legal decision, the decision-maker has
to gather some fixing elements, some incipiently determinant points of reference;
otherwise, the process of deciding would disappear in pure responsiveness. The
determinant cannot, however, be complete in itself. Its very persistence as stable,
predictable, decided law depends on its constantly responding and adjusting to every
moment of impinging difference which confronts it. Enduring determination
depends, then, on responsiveness. It must ever sustain an illimitable capacity to be
other than what it is, a capacity compatible with its being quite other to what it is—
compatible ultimately with its reversal. Perhaps the most compendious illustration
comes from the clash of guiding legal maxims produced in situations of extreme
challenge to law where, to translate from the Latin, the responsive clarion to “let
justice be done though the heavens fall” confronts the determinant counter that “the
preservation of the republic is the supreme law.” We also come across numerous
ways in which these two dimensions are brought together in law. “Equity” provides
a dramatic instance, using the term in its usual association with the common law (but
it could be extended to equivalents found in various principles of interpretation and
general standards in civil codes). Although usually advanced as a supplement to the

19

Derrida, supra note 3, at 23.

20

Id.; JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH 65 (David Wills trans. 1995).

21

J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLITICAL TRIALS 149 (2d ed. 1986).
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common law mitigating its constrained legalism, the pivotal ability of equity
explicitly to combine law’s determination with its responsiveness is indicated in the
two most common criticisms leveled at it: it was either too much a matter of
arbitrary discretion, varying with “the length of the Chancellor’s foot,” or it lost its
essential flexibility through a rigid respect for precedent.
Coming closer to my central concern, judicial discourse on the death penalty, let
me take the judicial decision as a final general instance. There is a necessary, if
usually blithe, acceptance of a radical duality in the judicial role. In sentencing, for
example, the judge is supposed to stand constantly, objectively apart from popular
sentiment, especially of the more atavistic kind, yet also to have a responsive regard
to such sentiment. Conflicting “rules” of interpretation enable the judge to render a
statute in a fixedly “literal” way or, alternatively, in a responsively expansive way
which has a continuing regard to the purpose or to the “mischief” the statute was
supposedly aimed at. Generally, judges are observed more and more to be giving
effect to changing times when making their decisions, yet they never do only that.
Rather, they always seek to base the decision in what is already given. The resulting
duality is reflected in the alternation of criticisms of judges for being too rigid or too
loose, too conservative or too liberal, too remote or too involved, too cold or too
passionate. What is happening here is that the judicial decision subsists in-between
these dualities. It can neither dissipate in responsiveness nor be completely predetermined. In either scenario, there would simply be no decision.
Whilst in this engaged mode, let us plunge straight into the equivalent juridical
division in cases on the death penalty. In the whole post-Furman era, that is for over
a quarter of a century now, the judiciary has posited and wrestled with a seemingly
intractable division when deciding on the application of the death penalty. The terms
of that divide have become quite set. There must, on one side, be a responsive
regard for “the uniqueness of the individual” being sentenced. In this same vein, it is
said there must be “fundamental fairness.” For such things, obviously, there has to
be a broad and effective “discretion” in the decision-maker. Yet, this seeming
imperative is accompanied by the refrain that discretion cannot be “unbridled.” As it
is put again and again, “arbitrariness” has to be avoided. There has to be a
determinant “objectivity,” “rationality,” and “consistency.”22
The supposed solution has been the guiding of discretion in terms of legislatively
specified conditions. A typical patterning of these can be found in the Ohio death
penalty statute which, in setting out “criteria for imposing death . . . for a capital
offense,” lists nine “aggravating circumstances” which are to be considered in
relation to seven mitigating “factors.”23 As Justice Powell helpfully described a
similar arrangement, “the various factors . . . do not have numerical weights attached
to them.”24 Indeed, a great many of these factors are very broad and, in their terms,
import a large discretion. But even if definite numerical weights were attributed to
these factors, the combining of nine circumstances with seven factors would produce
a staggering number of possible permutations. Quite apart from all that, there would
remain Justice Harlan's observation that “no list of circumstances would ever be
22

See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(provides a good coverage in these terms).
23

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (WEST 1999).

24

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976).
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really complete”; to which he would add that the prior elaboration of factors “which
call for the death penalty” appears to be “beyond present human ability.”25 Coming
inevitably to Justice Blackmun's incandescent dissent in Callins v. Collins,26 it is for
reasons such as these, combined with his view that it was impossible to reconcile a
responsive fairness with a determinant consistency, that he announced his resolve
“from this day forward” to “no longer tinker with the machinery of death.”27
Admirable as the sentiments may be, fundamental problems are raised by the
reasoning. There are two such problems. One is to do with the allegedly exceptional
quality of the death penalty—with whether death does make a difference, as the
common claim has it, and with what that difference may be. The other problem has
to do with the telos of standard judicial and other reformist arguments against the
death penalty.28 The issue here is whether these are ultimately arguments against the
penalty itself, against its being the death penalty, or arguments against its
administration and utility. I will now briefly consider these problems. That
consideration may, for some, incline my thesis towards the acceptability of the death
penalty, but I will move on to show how these problems orient us towards a position
where the death penalty becomes insupportable “in” law.
First then, the question of whether the decision to impose the death penalty is
exceptional. Justice Blackmun would only go so far as to say: “There is a
heightened need for fairness in the administration of death.”29 This does not show
whether or how the judgment to deal death is different to any other legal decision.
The desiderata that he and others propound – the achievement or the balancing of
fairness and objectivity—are obviously not exclusive to decisions about capital
punishment. Nor is the labelling of such decisions as arbitrary. The scene of legal
judgment, as we visited it earlier, is inevitably arbitrary. It does not, and cannot,
cognitively extend to all things that may make the decision what it is. The decision
is always a choice and a denial, a “cutting” into the infinite variety of inclination,
fact, and circumstance that could possibly inform it.30
If in terms of its judicial presentation, the death penalty cannot be dislodged as
exceptional, can the arguments specifically advanced against it be any more
successful? It has, for example, often been argued judicially that the death penalty
should not be imposed on juveniles or on the mentally incapacitated because of their
attenuated responsibility.31 This, however, is inexorably to say that the death penalty
should and can be imposed where responsibility is found ample enough. And the
25

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204, 208 (1971) vacated, Crampton v. Ohio, 408
U.S. 941 (1972).
26

Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1994).

27

114 S. Ct. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

28

There is a poignancy to “telos” here in that it “means at once ‘perfection,’ ‘completion,’
‘death.’”; ROBERTO CALASSO, THE MARRIAGE OF CADMUS AND HARMONY 19 (Tim Parks trans.
1993).
29

Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1132.

30

Derrida, supra note 3, at 24.

31

See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); McCollum v. North Carolina,
512 U.S. 1254 (1994).
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original argument, progressive as it well may be in other ways, leaves open the
question of degree, the question of how old, how mentally effective one has to be in
order to be put to death. In a very strict constructionist vein, Justice Scalia would
project us back to the initial publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws
of England in 1769 and claim that this work somehow informed the making of the
Eighth Amendment; then in Blackstone’s capacious reaches, he finds that capital
punishment in England could be imposed at the age of seven years.32 He does not
quite have the courage of his convictions. He does not go on to hold that seven
seems a reasonable age at which to put children to death. The very debate about
infantile or mental capacity imports a resolution as its orienting telos—imports an
appropriate point at which the child, etc., can be killed. Debates of this kind are
often combined with the argument that the death penalty is not justified where
incapacity would negate or diminish its deterrent effect. The massive implication of
this argument, however, is that where the accused’s capacity is sufficient, deterrence
can be effective and, on that ground, the death penalty is justified.
Let me take another significant set of arguments advanced against the death
penalty which, valuable as they are in themselves, nonetheless end up being
complicit with it. These are arguments to the effect that, because of limiting or
defective or corrupt procedures, or because of incompetent representation of the
accused, a wrongful verdict may have been reached or such a verdict is being
sustained—and, for good measure, the increasing limitation on review is seen as
sheltering these travesties.33 Judges quite often see the failure of the so-called
system in these terms and quite often hope, if not always expect, that “one day this
[Supreme] Court will develop procedural rules or verbal formulas that actually will
provide consistency, fairness, and reliability in a capital sentencing scheme.”34
Again, one could hardly impugn such arguments as far as they go, but they go too far
in at least implicitly advancing a realizable truth justifying the imposition of the
death penalty.
The drama of recent events demands that such arguments be illustrated outside of
the sphere of the judicial. Governor George Ryan, after inveighing last week against
“the shameful record” of his state of Illinois “of convicting innocent people and
putting them on death row,” announced both a moratorium on executions and his
intention to appoint a panel to study the sentences of death.35 The immediate drama
lay not only in the surprise of the announcement but also in the Italians lighting up
the Coliseum to celebrate—an apt location perhaps, given the amount of capital
punishing that went on there. But this, as well as other exuberant responses, is at
32
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864; SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND vols. 1-4 (1978). Justice Scalia finds “original” justification in the Constitution for
the death penalty itself. Evoking the Fifth Amendment and the inclusion there of capital crime
within its protective range, he finds that this “clearly permits” the death penalty. Callins, 114
S. Ct. at 1128. Simply presupposing the existence of something is not “permitting” it.
33

See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
34

Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

35

Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Verdict Errors, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000,
at A1.
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best premature. Governor Ryan supports the death penalty. The moratorium will
remain in force until, says the Governor, “I can be sure that everyone sentenced to
death in Illinois is truly guilty, until I can be sure with moral certainty that no
innocent man or woman is facing a lethal injection.”36 There is, then, still a
discoverable certainty to all this, and the Governor's standard of such certainty may
not be very stringent. In announcing a moratorium, he described the “system” as
having only come “close to the ultimate nightmare, the state's taking of innocent
life.” Given the large part which chance played in revealing the innocence of so
many, almost as many of the condemned had been exonerated as executed, it is at
least probable that there are innocent others among those whom the system has
disposed of.
I will soon take up other arguments against the death penalty which provide an
affirmation of it, but for now I will conclude this present account of those arguments
by looking at perhaps the strongest one of them. This argument would deny that the
death penalty could ever be imposed with assurance. “The problem,” says Justice
Blackmun, “is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a
system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants.”37 The trouble with this
argument is that, like the others, it is wedded to a positive, realizable truth, a truth
that could have prevailed without the error. It allows of a justified imposition of
capital punishment where the truth of the situation is perceived as cogent or
overwhelming. More significantly, it still allows of irresolvable contention with
utilitarian varieties of truth. It may be, as the English nostrum has it, that it is better
for ten of the guilty to go free than for one of the innocent to be convicted, but it is
arguably preferable for one of the innocent to be executed rather than ten of the
guilty go free. The argument has been put bluntly by, mirabile dictu, a Chicago
prosecutor:
Sooner or later, it is going to happen. It comes with the territory. It is not
humanly possible to design a system that is perfect. And if people are not
prepared for the eventuality that human institutions are going to make
mistakes, then they shouldn’t support the death penalty, and they
shouldn’t elect legislators who support it.38
So, if these various arguments against capital punishment do not definitively
counter the decision to inflict death, and if judicial analysis of the death penalty
simply reproduces the dimensions of ordinary legal decision-making, what—to
borrow a phrase—is the difference death makes? To set that question, I will return
to my initial argument advancing law as a putative settlement of the space inbetween these dimensions—in-between determinate position and what was ever
beyond it. That line of argument was most evidently set against the standard
assertions of law’s stability, fixity, implacability, or, in the language so often used in
36

Id. at A16. The tendency since has been very much Ryanwards. For example, Bills
have been introduced into the House and Senate to enhance the “protection” of those accused
of capital crimes. Editorial, Bills to Stop Executing the Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at
A30. And “[r]acial disparities in death sentences are to be reviewed by the Justice
Department.” World-Wide, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at 1.
37

Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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See Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov., 1999, at 66, 88.
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capital cases, against law's finality. Even at its most settled, or especially at its most
settled, we saw that law could not “be” otherwise than responsive to what was
beyond its determinate content “for the time being.” Neither, however, could law
dissipate in a pure responsiveness. Hence, there were the contrary yet standard
claims as to what law may be outlined at the beginning of my talk—the division
between determinant force and responsiveness with-in the rule of law, the
combination of Leviathan's awesome assurance with an unexpectedly
accommodating side, the jurisprudential division between law's autonomy and its
dependence on society, history, and such. How or in what terms can law in this
insistent ambivalence have some place, some palpability, some hold? Even if it
cannot be positively rendered in terms of existent situations, law is nonetheless
always operatively attached to such situations, and it is in the legal decision, in the
place of legal judgment, that law becomes operative. Such decision or judgment
cannot be reduced to antecedents or to some “factual” truth. There cannot, that is, be
a complete comprehending of everything to which a decision has responded or will
respond. Law can always be other than what it “is.” The hope extinguished in its
determinative fixity is resurrected in its responsiveness.
To convey the difference freighted with death, let me continue, in what is now
leading to a conclusion, to mirror the path of my lecture so far by considering two
further judicial arguments which would both counter yet implicitly affirm the death
penalty. First, an argument which goes some way towards accommodating law's
responsive dimension. When looking at standards of responsibility, or at what is
“cruel and unusual” in terms of punishment, or at the proportionate relation between
crime and penalty, judges have derived meliorative content or assurance from the
practices of various societies. The problem with this resort, so far as it is used to
counter the penalty of death, is that the practices of societies can become more rather
than less draconic, something which Justice Scalia has been quick to observe,39 and
yet again the death penalty becomes more embedded in law through reformist
discourse rather than excluded from it. For the development of my argument,
however, there is a further point which this resort to the social tends to emphasize
and that is, as we have seen, the essential openness of law cannot be bound to or by
any specific reference to social practice or in any other way. The quality of openness
has to be sustained. The second line of argument starkly makes the point in relation
to racial discrimination in legal processes leading to the imposition of the death
penalty.40 Reformist argument here may not appear to be an advance on the others.
It could be heard as saying that in the rectifying, actual or potential, of such racial
discrimination, capital punishment is being affirmed. Let me now combine these
two arguments, one based on evidence of the social and the other on racial
discrimination, and indicate their undermining effect on the sustainability of capital
punishment in law.
In the situation of racial discrimination, what difference does death make with its
“unique finality,” to borrow a pointed judicial phrase?41 After all, in a certain literal
sense, with its “cutting” determination the scene of legal judgment is inevitably
39

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

40

See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989).
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Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 955 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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discriminatory. Some modes of existence are elevated in the decision and others
suppressed or ignored. Law, however, maintains its seductive appeal to the excluded
through its responsive ability always to be other than what it is. The penalty of death
denies that prospect. It denies the protean promise held out by the rule of law to
extend equally to all its subjects and to surmount, in particular, all differences of
ascribed status. With the imposition of the death penalty, the other is excluded
utterly in the name of law itself. The Supreme Court's effort to counter this effect
ends up by aggravating it. Here we come inexorably to the much-discussed miasma
that is McCleskey v. Kemp.42
In McCleskey the court faced the dissolution of the whole scene of legal
judgment. The defendant McCleskey, described as a black man, had been sentenced
to death in Georgia for the murder of a police officer described as white. It was
claimed by or for McCleskey that the imposition of this penalty was racially
discriminatory and that this discrimination violated the requirement of equal
protection of the laws in the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibiting of “cruel
and unusual punishment” in the Eighth. The case turned on the nature of the
evidence supporting these claims. This comprised a study, known as the Baldus
study, which showed in general statistical terms that defendants charged with killing
white victims were much more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants
charged with killing black victims. By eliminating the effect of an array of nonracial variables, the study sought to show that race was “a” or “the” decisive factor.
This was the relevant evidence, but the study also extended to, and the court was
manifestly worried about, other statistical evidence of discrimination in capital cases
in Georgia. Henry Louis Gates summarized matters this way:
The Baldus study was scrutinized and hailed by various prominent
statisticians, including the representatives of the National Academy of
Sciences, as among the most sophisticated empirical work ever done on
criminal sentencing. The experts agreed that the Baldus study proved that
capital sentencing in Georgia is a discriminatory process.43
The minority decisions in this case accepted the statistical evidence as
establishing unconstitutional discrimination. The majority did not. They would not
have accepted that any statistical evidence could establish the requisite
discrimination.44 Discrimination had to be intentionally or purposively directed
against the defendant specifically. For the majority, statistical probability was not

42
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1986). For discussions particularly germane to my
argument here see Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and
Remedies from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45
MERCER L. REV. 1035 (1994); Henry Louis Gates, Statistical Stigmata, in DECONSTRUCTION
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds. 1992).
43

Gates, supra note 42, at 334.
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This view of the majority opinion was seemingly not shared by one of its members,
Justice Scalia. See Dorin, supra note 42. It remained the view of the writer of that opinion,
however, even as he came to reject the decision itself. See JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994).
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enough even if for Justice Brennan in the minority the “empirical” quality of such
evidence was its strength.45
What the majority propounded, again and again, was the “uniqueness” of each
case, of each capital crime and of each capital defendant. Judges and juries had to be
unlimited in their ability to accommodate this uniqueness, to exercise their
“fundamental . . . discretion”, to “consider” the “varying” and “innumerable factors”
potentially involved.46 In all this, juries must be allowed to decide matters in their
own “unpredictable”, “varying”, and ultimately inexplicable ways, even if this will
involve “some risk” of racial discrimination.47 The horrifying alternative summoned
up by the majority was the dissolution of the whole criminal justice system. If
statistical evidence of racial oppression were given effect, then the like effect would
have to be given to “other kinds of prejudice” extending, for example, to
“membership in other minority groups and even to gender”, or to “the defendant’s
facial characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or the victim”,
or, it could be added, to the poverty of the defendant; furthermore, this dissipating
responsiveness would extend to “other types of penalty” beside death.48 “Relying”
on the Baldus study, then, “questions the very heart of the criminal justice system.”49
Indeed. It is, however, completely contradictory to elevate utterly an illimitable
responsiveness to the specific defendant—elevate it so high as to exclude cogent
societal evidence of pertinent oppressions—and then utterly to deny that
responsiveness by visiting death on that defendant. Such a death not only freezes
forever the range and quality of possible responsiveness to that defendant, it also
effects a general denial of law’s responsiveness. Law cannot be hermetically trapped
in this way and yet be operatively sustained as law.
Short of complete dissolution, it has often been observed, and aptly established,
that within the operation of the death penalty the criminal law becomes, as it is put,
distorted, and especially where responsiveness to the accused is truncated; and there
are clear indications also that the denial of law's responsiveness debases the legal
system as a whole.50 I will end with what are perhaps the two most egregious.
One involves restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus. A leading U. S. authority
puts the significance of the writ fairly typically: “The writ of habeas corpus, by
which the legal authority under which a person may be detained can be challenged, is
of immemorial antiquity . . . . Today it is said to be ‘perhaps the most important writ
known to constitutional law of England’ . . . . Its significance in the United States
has been no less great.”51 A little more exactly, the modern function of the writ,
challenging arrogations of the executive, dates from the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.52 Its more general use to challenge the legality of any detention is even
45

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 338.

46

Id. at 294, 311.
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Id. at 305, 308, 311.
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Id. at 308, 315-17.
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Id. at 313 n.37.
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CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 350 (5th ed. 1994).
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more venerable and can be traced as far back as an English case of 1214 from which
it is clear that the writ already had a settled existence.53 Habeas corpus, in short, has
had a very long history as a responsive conduit for the reversal or modification of
legal determination. Because of its impertinent effectiveness in challenging death
penalty decisions, its general ability to uphold constitutional imperatives has been
judicially narrowed.54 This narrowing has been legislatively matched in various
ways, for example by the establishing of a one-year limit on filing petitions for
habeas corpus, a limit which comes from the candidly titled Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. It was a string of successful petitions for
habeas corpus in Vasquez v. Harris which provided the most startling denial of law’s
responsiveness, and thence of law itself.55 With a manifest petulance, the Supreme
Court proclaimed that “No further stays of Robert Alton Harris's execution shall be
entered by the federal courts except upon the order of this Court”—a diktat of naked
determination aptly described as “lawless.”56 Judge Kozinski commented on that
command, with a like disregard for the law, that “the drama had no other possible
outcome,” and he somehow discerned that “enough is enough.”57
Foucault once observed that in law we have not as yet “cut off the head of the
King.”58 From the aphorism’s resonant meanings, we can for now conclude with
one, that in law we still seek or at least purport to find a transcendent truth, a truth
that is sufficient and entire, a truth which allows us to find and decree an ultimate
“enough.” To take a stark example which concludes a recent and highly critical
survey of the operation of the death penalty in the United States:
The steady accumulation of wrongful convictions and death sentences in
the United States constitutes a prima facie case that we are dealing with
widespread, systemic flaws in the administration of justice. Until those
flaws are corrected, we should declare a moratorium on executions.59
This is to seek a quality of truth in a place—the scene of legal judgment—where
it cannot be found. Obviously, there has to be a determinate decision, some limits,
some lack of responsiveness, if law is to “be” at all. Granted that, there still remains
the matter of how the limits were reached, how the decision was made, how it is to
be sustained and regarded; and in all these things there is a judgment, a choice, a
denial of what could otherwise be.
Being attuned to the responsiveness
accommodated and the responsiveness eliminated in the decision could orient and
even impel us towards the recognition of many things—towards the recognition that
the legal decision cannot be accorded a complete and positive content, a recognition
that such a decision is ultimately unknowable, that it is inevitably partial and
53
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arbitrary, that it entails the denial and sacrifice of the other, and the recognition that,
to minimize these ineluctable defects, the decision must be made and brought to bear
in as open, accountable and revisable a manner as possible. The death penalty, even
as it denies law's necessary responsiveness, pushes us to a horizon of law where
responsiveness cannot be ignored and where its disturbing implications for the nature
of the legal decision become insistent. That is another story. For now, enough has to
be enough.
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